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Abstract. Over the years, artificial neural networks have been applied
successfully in many areas including IT security. Yet, neural networks
can only process continuous input data. This is particularly challenging
for security-related non-continuous data like system calls. This work fo-
cuses on four different options to preprocess sequences of system calls so
that they can be processed by neural networks. These input options are
based on one-hot encoding and learning word2vec or GloVe representa-
tions of system calls. As an additional option, we analyze if the mapping
of system calls to their respective kernel modules is an adequate gen-
eralization step for (a) replacing system calls or (b) enhancing system
call data with additional information regarding their context. However,
when performing such preprocessing steps it is important to ensure that
no relevant information is lost during the process. The overall objec-
tive of system call based intrusion detection is to categorize sequences of
system calls as benign or malicious behavior. Therefore, this scenario is
used to evaluate the different input options as a classification task. The
results show, that each of the four different methods is a valid option
when preprocessing input data, but the use of kernel modules only is
not recommended because too much information is being lost during the
mapping process.
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1 Introduction
In the age of digitization, many process flows involving personal or otherwise
critical data have been digitized. Hence, it is more important than ever to protect
data against unauthorized access and a lot of research on intrusion detection
has been done over the past few years. An obvious approach for this task is to
monitor the system calls of different processes running on a host. Since standard
application programs are running in user mode, they are not allowed to access the
resources of an operating system on their own. Even for simple activities (like
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reading or writing a file), programs need to make a request to the operating
system’s kernel in the form of system calls. Hence, if a program is exploited,
every action the exploit takes will also be mirrored within the system call trace
of the program. Consequently, system calls have widely been used as data source
for security-critical events in intrusion detection [3,7,12,13,14,21]. A simplified
approach is using the kernel modules to which the system calls belong rather
than the system calls [18].
Problem Setting. The increasing interest in (deep) neural networks has
also reached the area of IT security in recent years. Neural networks, however,
can only process continuous input data. Yet, many security-related data like
system calls are non-continuous data which constitutes a major limitation to
the application of neural networks in this area. In particular, neural networks
cannot be directly applied to system calls as these do not conform to the expected
input formats.
Objective. We intend to (pre–)process system calls in such a way that they
can be analyzed through neural networks. Preprocessing can be accomplished
in many ways. Complex structures like language demand a more sophisticated
preprocessing step since, e.g., context information can play a decisive role for
understanding a sentence. The field of natural language processing (NLP) has
different approaches for inserting context into a word. Since logs of system calls
are basically textual data where temporal ordering is relevant, we want to in-
vestigate the suitability of different approaches from NLP to transform system
calls into continuous input data for neural networks.
Approach and Contribution. Benign and malicious behavior of processes
can be analyzed by looking at sequences of system calls. Following this line, this
work explores Long Short Term Memory Networks (LSTMs) for processing se-
quences of system calls. LSTMs are a type of neural networks which are able to
process sequence data [11]. As mentioned above, preprocessing system calls such
that they can be processed by neural networks is a crucial issue. In particular, it
should be ensured that no relevant information is lost during the preprocessing
step. We examine four preprocessing approaches from NLP, namely (1) one-hot
encoding, (2) expanding the original network structure by an additional embed-
ding layer and learning (3) word2vec and (4) GloVe representations of system
calls prior to the classification task. Evaluation uses the ADFA-LD dataset [2].
As an alternative to using the original system calls, several generalizations
might be applicable. For instance, system calls can be mapped to the kernel
modules in which they are defined in. The four different representations used on
the raw system call data are also applied to this kernel module representation.
Because the respective kernel modules may contain additional information about
the relationship between different system calls, a combination of system calls and
kernel modules is also examined as input.
The paper’s main contribution is a systematic evaluation of different pre-
processing methods for system calls such that they can be used in LSTMs for
detecting security critical events (malicious behavior). To the best of our knowl-
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edge, we are the first to test GloVe for system call representation and also to
use a combination of system calls and kernel modules as input options.
Structure. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
related approaches for intrusion detection using system calls. Section 3 provides
details on the four preprocessing approaches analyzed in this work. Section 4
presents available datasets and their properties. Experiments and results are
presented in Sections 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes this work.
2 Related Work
This Section focuses on how sequences of system calls can be interpreted for
intrusion detection and how the application of neural networks puts even more
emphasis on the proper preprocessing of input data.
Starting with the work of Forrest et al. [7], the use of system call sequences
for anomaly or intrusion detection has gained considerable interest. Forrest et
al. interpret system calls as categorical values and compare them with respect
to equality or inequality. They use a sliding window across system call traces of
benign programs to identify the relative positions of system calls to each other
and store them in a database. If a program is run, its trace is compared to the
known relative positions from the database. Accumulated deviations between
the current trace and database data which exceed a threshold may indicate an
attack.
Ever since a lot of research has been based on the use of system call se-
quences for intrusion detection. During the last decade, methods shifted from
Hidden Markov Models [6,10,15] and Support Vector Machines [5,24] towards
various kinds of neural networks [1,3,13]. As neural networks can only process
numerical data, a lot of effort was put into the meaningful transformation of sys-
tem call sequences into numerical representations. Popular methods from NLP
were applied to represent the traces, since temporal ordering of input data is
also very important for analyzing language.
Creech et al. [3] create semantic models based on context-free grammars.
Similar to Forrest [7], they create a database of normal behavior, but then use
counting to generate input features for a decision engine. The database is built by
forming a dictionary containing every contiguous trace by using multiple sliding
window sizes, denoting the resulting traces as words. Those words (dictionary
entries) are again combined to form phrases of length one to five. Finally, the
counts of actual occurrences of those phrases are fed into different decision en-
gines, e.g. a neural network called Extreme Learning Machine (ELM). Xie et al.
[26], however, found that learning the dictionary is extremely time consuming,
in particular an entire week for the ADFA-LD dataset.
Murtaza et al. [18] aim at reducing the execution time of anomaly detectors
by representing system call traces as sequences of kernel module interactions.
They map each single system call to its corresponding kernel module, thus reduc-
ing the range of input values from approximately 300 system calls to eight kernel
modules. This approach achieves similar or fewer false alarms and is much faster.
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Yet, the original seven kernel modules of a 32 bit Unix system (architecture, file
systems, inter process communication, kernel, memory management, network-
ing, and security) need to be extended by another kernel module (unknown) to
capture all possible system calls, since the system call table the authors use does
not comprise every system call within the ADFA-LD.
While neural networks are widely used as classifiers, they can also be em-
ployed to extract a meaningful representation of the input data. Two of the most
popular approaches up to date are word2vec [17] and GloVe [19]. Both methods
are heavily used in NLP as they can extract a vector representation of words
regarding their context of use. Variants of word2vec have already been used by
Ring et al. [20] for network-based intrusion detection.
Following a similar idea, Kim et al. [13] combine an additional embedding
layer with a LSTM-based sequence predictor. The authors state that through
using an additional fully-connected layer in front of a LSTM layer, the sequence
fed into the neural network becomes embedded to continuous space in a first
step. Since the authors use this LSTM-based approach for sequence prediction
on the ADFA-LD dataset as well, we adopt the idea of adding an additional
embedding layer as one potential (built-in) preprocessing approach. The single
system calls become embedded before reaching the LSTM layer.
3 Comparison of System Call Representations
The overall purpose of this work is to compare four different methods of system
call representation such that neural networks can process them. Since isolated
system calls do not contain any clue regarding their intent (benign or malicious),
it is necessary to take their relationships into account by analyzing sequences of
system calls.
Consequently, a simple LSTM classifier is used for comparing the four input
methods. The LSTM classifier used, in its original definition, consists of an input
layer, a LSTM layer, a fully connected (FC) layer and an output layer. Figure 1
on the left shows the used network structure for three of the four methods being
compared. The right side shows the network structure for the fourth method.
The main contribution is the comparison of system call representation tech-
niques, in particular widely used methods from NLP. The use of a LSTM for
classification is a mere tool to show the effect different input methods have on the
intent of a sequence (benign or malicious). Again, our approach should not be
seen as a solution to intrusion detection, but rather as a systematic comparison
of different input possibilities.
Like Murtaza et al. [18], we map system calls to their corresponding kernel
modules. Since ADFA-LD was recorded on an Ubuntu 11.04 32 bit operating
system, all system calls can be assigned to their respective kernel modules by
looking into the system call implementation in the source files of kernel 2.6.35.
Thus, in contrast to [18], no unknown kernel module is needed.
With this, three forms of input to a neural network emerge for a compre-
hensive comparison: Using (1) only the system call representation, (2) only the
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Fig. 1. Network structures used.
kernel module representation or (3) both combined. Consequently, this paper
compares twelve different input variants of four categories as discussed below.
One-hot encoding. One-hot encoding is the typical approach for feeding
categorical data into a neural network. Each system call is represented with a
vector in which every position represents a specific system call. Hence, the size of
the input vector equals the number of different system calls. A particular system
call is mapped to a binary vector of all zeros except for a single one at the
appropriate position for the corresponding call. This method of representation
will be tested using three forms: (1) The system calls in one-hot encoding. (2)
The mapped kernel modules in one-hot encoding. (3) Both one-hot vectors (the
system call vector of size 341 and the module vector of size 7) concatenated.
Any of these input techniques will be referred as One-hot in the following.
Additional Embedding Layer. This category accords with one-hot encod-
ing, except for an additional (fully-connected) embedding layer between input
and LSTM layers (see right part of Figure 2). Thus, the input will be embed-
ded to a continuous vector representation using the embedding layer in front of
the LSTM layer. This approach is inspired by a similar network structure for
sequence prediction [13]. As before, the following three forms of input will be
used: (1) The system calls in one-hot encoding. (2) The mapped kernel modules
in one-hot encoding. (3) Both one-hot vectors (the system call vector of size 341
and the module vector of size 7) concatenated. These input techniques using the
additional embedding layer, will be referred to as Additional in this work.
Word2vec. One-hot encoding has still many meaningful applications and is
very popular due to its simplicity, but cannot cope with more complex struc-
tures like natural language text since the meaning of words may depend on
their context. Mikolov et al. [17] presented an approach now known as word2vec
which generates word vectors based on the context in which they are used. Word
vectors may be used following two approaches, namely the Continuous Bag-of-
Words model (CBOW) and the Skip-Gram model. CBOW learns to predict
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target words from given context (e.g. the context being ’Molly is already at’
and the target word being ’home’). The Skip-Gram model works the other way
around, predicting context from a target word. The basic idea of word2vec is
to train a neural network, discard the model, but use the weights of the fully
trained hidden layer as word vectors.
Since system calls may also vary in their intent (benign or malicious) given
their context around them, we adapt this NLP approach using the CBOW model.
Consequently, this category consists of the following three input methods: (1)
The system calls in word2vec representation. (2) The mapped kernel modules
in word2vec representation. (3) The concatenation of system calls in word2vec
representation and one-hot encoded kernel modules. This input category will be
referred to as word2vec in this work.
GloVe. GloVe [19] is a count-based model that also learns a vector repre-
sentation of words regarding their context. For GloVe, context amounts to a
co-occurrence matrix, thus including word statistics into their model. GloVe is
then trained with the non-zero entries of that co-occurrence matrix. As with
word2vec, this category consists of the three input methods: (1) The system
calls in GloVe representation. (2) The mapped kernel modules in GloVe repre-
sentation. (3) The concatenation of system calls in GloVe representation and
one-hot encoded kernel modules. These three forms of input will be referred to
as GloVe in the remaining chapters.
4 Data
Three well-known datasets, namely the DARPA [4], UNM [23] and ADFA-LD
[2], are very popular for evaluating and comparing host-based intrusion detection
systems. A typical system call sent to the kernel consists of its name, parameters
and a return value. Since number and type of the transfer values vary among
system calls, many researchers focus on analyzing only the temporal ordering of
system calls, i.e. their names, but neglecting parameters to reduce complexity
[3,7,25,26]. Hence, popular datasets like the UNM and ADFA-LD only take the
system calls names into account.
The DARPA and UNM datasets are already more than 15 years old, but still
in use due to a lack of better alternatives. However, they are also heavily criticised
due to their age and lack of complexity [16]. Creech et al. [2] recorded the ADFA-
LD dataset in order to replace the outdated DARPA (KDD) collection. Hence
we focus solely on the newer ADFA-LD set recorded in 2013.
The ADFA-LD dataset consists of three parts named Training Data Master,
Attack Data Master and Validation Data Master, which contain files with sys-
tem call traces of processes. Table 1 shows the number of system calls and traces
contained in the three dataset partitions together with the type of behavior.
Only the Attack Data Master contains exploited processes. In order to use
the ADFA-LD dataset for classification, the attack subset needs to be split, mix-
ing one half with the training and the other half with the validation subset. Since
training and attack subsets encompass roughly the same number of system calls,
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Table 1. Number of System Calls and Traces in ADFA-LD.
System Calls Traces Label of Traces
Training 308077 833 benign
Attack 317388 746 malicious
Validation 2122085 4372 benign
the new combined training dataset is skewed with respect to its class label after
splitting the attack subset. The new set contains around twice as many benign
sequences as malicious sequences. This is even worse in the validation data set
since splitting results in a combination of the original roughly 2000000 system
calls from benign traces and approximately 150000 system calls from malicious
traces. If such a skewed model classifies every input as benign, an accuracy of
93% will be achieved even without any attacks detected. Working with these
unbalanced sets demands two adaptations: (1) To avoid a resulting model which
tends to classify sequences as benign, the new training set is balanced by us-
ing data point duplication in the less represented class. This technique is called
random oversampling [9]. (2) Since the new combined validation dataset is ex-
tremely unbalanced, accuracy is no clear indicator towards the quality of the
sequence classifier. Therefore, true positive rates and false positive rates (TPR
and FPR) are used as evaluation criteria.
Training the LSTM model using a whole process trace file does not make
much sense due to the nature of attacks. An intrusion detection system should
not wait until an exploit reaches its end, but rather intervene early, e.g. by
stopping the exploited process. A typical approach (see Section 2) is to use
sliding windows to split the dataset into smaller sequences for training, attaching
the corresponding label of the trace. A process trace is divided into smaller
sequences that can be processed without waiting for the process to end. In this
work, a sliding window size of 20 is used due to the structure of the ADFA-LD.
The Attack Data Master consists of traces of exploited processes. Yet, not every
partial sequence exhibits malicious behavior, but it still would be labeled by
the overall intent of the process (malicious). For example, a process may start
normally and an attack could exploit a vulnerability near the end of the trace.
So, to reduce the risk of learning malicious labels for benign sequences we refrain
from using typical smaller window sizes like 5, 6 or 11 as used in [7].
5 Experiments
5.1 Experiment Setup
Table 2 shows the parameters used for the neural networks. For a fair com-
parison, the same overall parameters are used in all settings. Embedding sizes
are generally set to the size of 8 except when using kernel modules only. Since
there are only seven different kernel modules compared to 341 different system
calls or 348 system calls and kernel modules combined, using identical sizes for
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embedding, LSTM and fully-connected (FC) layer is not reasonable. Thus, an
embedding size and FC size of 3 is used when working with kernel modules
only. In Table 2, text embedding parameters like the vector size of word2vec or
GloVe are indicated as TE (text embedding). Text embeddings are learned for
10 epochs.
Table 2. Parameterset (N.A. – not applicable).
Source Method TE Size TE
Window
Embed
Size
LSTM
Size
FC Size
System
Calls
One-Hot N.A. N.A. N.A. 32 16
Additional N.A. N.A. 8 32 16
Word2vec 8 5 N.A. 32 16
GloVe 8 5 N.A. 32 16
Kernel
Modules
One-Hot N.A. N.A. N.A. 5 3
Additional N.A. N.A. 3 5 3
Word2vec 3 5 N.A. 5 3
GloVe 3 5 N.A. 5 3
Both
One-Hot N.A. N.A. N.A. 32 16
Additional N.A. N.A. 8 32 16
Word2vec 8 5 N.A. 32 16
GloVe 8 5 N.A. 32 16
Dropout is a general strategy to avoid overfitting in neural networks [22],
whereas peepholes are an optimization specifically for the timing in LSTM cells
[8]. Here, dropout is set using a keeping probability of 0.8 for all experiments on
the final FC layer, and peepholes in the LSTM layers are set to true.
As mentioned in Section 4, we use a sequence length of 20. For fair com-
parison, each model is trained the same amount of epochs (20). Naturally, the
number of classes (benign, malicious) implies a size of 2 for the output layer.
5.2 Evaluation of Results
Table 3 shows the experiment results. Since the dataset is skewed in its class
distribution, higher accuracy does not necessarily mean a better result. As ex-
plained above, true positive rates (TPR) and false positives rates (FPR) might
be more meaningful. In our setting, a true positive is a correctly detected ma-
licious sequence while a false positive is a normal sequence that is classified to
be malicious. To reduce confounding effects, we conduct our experiments twice
on the ADFA-LD dataset with different splits. Table 3 shows the mean results
of both experiments.
There is always the risk that valuable information regarding the intent of a
sequence (benign or malicious) is lost during preprocessing steps. In our case,
this does not seems to be the case for all four transformation methods (one-hot,
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Table 3. Results: True Positive Rate/False Positive Rate (Accuracy).
One-hot Additional Word2vec GloVe
System
Calls
0.95/0.16
(0.85)
0.90/0.16
(0.85)
0.92/0.17
(0.84)
0.79/0.14
(0.85)
Kernel
Modules
0.80/0.24
(0.77)
0.89/0.25
(0.75)
0.77/0.25
(0.76)
0.77/0.24
(0.77)
Both 0.95/0.16
(0.86)
0.93/0.17
(0.84)
0.91/0.16
(0.85)
0.87/0.16
(0.84)
additional, word2vec or GloVe). Nevertheless, one-hot encoding, which is the
most direct transformation of the non-continuous system calls, achieves the best
results with a TPR of 0.95 and a FPR of 0.16.
Our results are in line with other intrusion detection based results on this
dataset. The resulst of Creech et al. [3] show a TPR of approximately 90% at a
FPR of around 15%. Xie et al. [26] achieve a TPR of 70% at a FPR of around
20%. It should however be noted, that those two approaches are anomaly-based
(hence they can not be directly compared to our classification-based results),
but even if the setting is not comparable, the similar range shows that the
representations work quite well.
However, using kernel modules only results in a considerably lower TPR and
higher FPR in comparison to our other approaches and is, thus, not advised
to use in this classification setting. Surprisingly, enriching the system call data
with their corresponding kernel modules does not yield better results. Also,
neither the additional embedding layer nor the pre-learned NLP representations
show better results than one-hot encoding without the additional embedding
layer. This might be because of the nature of LSTM cells. Since LSTM cells
automatically embed sequences of data, additional embedding prior to the LSTM
might not be helpful. However, aside from using kernel modules only, the overall
information regarding the intent of the sequences is being kept to a certain
extent. So far, we used the same overall parameters for all approaches in order
to have a fair comparison base. Better results could be achieved for each approach
with parameter optimization. By and large, each of the four methods seem to
be rewarding in their setting.
Which method from Table 3 is considered to be the best also heavily relies
on the problem setting at hand. In a setting of intrusion detection through
classification, we would argue that a small false positive rate is more important
than a high true positive rate for two reasons. (1) Analyzing an alert with respect
to it being a true or false positive is very expensive. (2) It may not even be
necessary to get all malicious sequences, since it is sufficient to raise an alert on
one of the malicious system call sequences within one exploited process trace. The
latter again depends on the problem setting or rather how to handle an attack
reported. For instance, in critical infrastructures it may be more important to
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capture every attack possible. In this case, analyzing potential false positives
may be a necessary evil.
6 Conclusion
This work systematically compares different input methods for system call traces
for intrusion detection. We use sequences of system calls, their mapped kernel
modules or a combination of both as representation options. The three input
options are combined with four different encodings, namely an one-hot vector,
learning an embedding while training, and using word2vec or GloVe representa-
tions.
Results imply that working with kernel modules exclusively is not recom-
mended for our setting, although they might still be helpful as supplementary
information in other settings. One-hot encoding showed the best results. The
other approaches, however, should not be discarded since they could be helpful
for more sophisticated models for intrusion detection. Also we compare every
approach with the same overall parameterset to achieve a fair comparison base.
Better results in terms of TPR or FPR might be achieved by optimizing a specific
approach.
With the results of this work in mind, future activities may focus on modeling
normal behavior of programs based on system call sequences.
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